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1. Overview and Scope of the Research 
 
The dissertation gives a comprehensive analysis of the statebuilding and state-formation in 
South Sudan while setting up and using a framework based on theories of international 
relations, theories of statebuilding and state-formation, as well as research methods of 
Africanist political science. In addition to this general framework, the specific literature on 
South Sudan was also used for complementing the detailed case study.   
The results of the analysis may enrich the theoretical scientific debate on statebuilding, 
promote critical scrutiny of statebuilding and state-formation in South Sudan, and make the 
local statebuilding practices more effective. 
The examination of statebuilding and state-formation is currently a major topic both in 
theoretical and practical terms. The statebuilding’s objects are mostly fragile / weak states that 
are at odds with, or emerge from, conflicts that pose a security risk at local, regional and global 
levels. 
The analysis and evaluation of the statebuilding’s active and state-formation’s passive 
conceptions, that we carried out in the context of South Sudan in our case study, is an important 
task for the theoretical foundation and implementation of statebuilding policies on the one hand 
and for the critical perspective, renewal and even dropping of statebuilding theories and 
practices on the other hand. 
The research tested on the case study the general theoretical framework that was set up 
during the review of individual statebuilding practices as analysed by the relevant authors 
(Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone, Liberia) and of local, regional and global 
(general) theories of statebuilding. 
The research is fundamentally deductive as it tested the validity of general and African 
specific statebuilding theories on the case study. However, the conclusions of the case study 
have an impact on the statebuilding theories and on the definition of statebuilding policies in 
global and regional centres. Therefore, the results of the research can be applied to local as well 
as regional and global levels in both theoretical and practical aspects. 
As South Sudan has appeared only recently as an example of statebuilding, in theory, 
the previous statebuilding experiences could have been applied to the new state. However, 
during the analysis, we have found that the singularities of the country (African colonist ruler, 
late independence, livestock-based economy, continuous conflict) do not allow the use of an 
existing template. Meanwhile, some of these particularities are also found in other statebuilding 
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„projects”, which makes the conclusions and observations of the analysis applicable to 
statebuilding theories and practices anywhere in the world where the same features occur.  
The (past) existence of similar issues elsewhere makes a comparative analysis with 
some African conflicts and statebuilding particularly useful. Here we think of successful 
conflict settlements in multi-ethnic states (Liberia, Rwanda), successful nation-building 
models (South Africa, Botswana) and the challenges that the combatant elite of the liberation 
movement turned into the ruling party face (Ethiopia, South Africa). 
The time limit for the research is June 2017, the moment of completion of the 
dissertation. Subsequent changes relevant for the case study are assumed based on existing 
plans (ARCSS1 schedule, presidential speeches, etc.) and the results of the analysis. 
The research is only limited to territorial boundaries in certain aspects of the case study: 
the parallel statebuildings in South Sudan that are events within South Sudan's borders, and 
the use of our external and internal terminologies (to be defined later).  
I am convinced that research on the South Sudanese statebuilding is as relevant to the 
future of the country as to the future of the African continent, to the statebuilding projects, to 
the UN peacekeeping and, in a broader sense, to the security and economic issues of the world. 
So much that it requires a change in the attitude of the international community and the ruling 
elite.  
                                                          
1 Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan: the peace agreement that meant to 
end the second Southern civil war that erupted in 2013. It was signed by the two major rival parties in August 
2015 in Addis Ababa. 
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2. Methodology and Hypotheses 
 
The dissertation sets up an analytical framework based on selected theories of international 
relations and statebuilding that can be used for analysing the statebuilding in South Sudan and 
answering the following research questions: 
 
What statebuilding practices are and were used by external and internal statebuilding 
actors in South Sudan? 
What were the results of the statebuilding practices applied in South Sudan in the virtual 
/ visible and real / invisible political spaces? 
How did these statebuilding practices and their results in South Sudan contribute to the 
emergence of the current civil war and can they possibly play a role in its ending? 
 
To answer these questions, the first step is to define the basic concepts and 
terminologies. The definition and conceptualization begins with defining the concept of the 
state. 
According to the state's classical, Westphalian, static definition, the sovereign state is 
a geographically well-defined institution with permanent population whose government has, in 
theory, unlimited power over the territory and is constitutionally independent of all external 
governments. 
Of course, strictly speaking, South Sudan, like so many other states, does not fully meet 
the criteria of this definition, since its border is disputed in many locations2 and the government 
does not have the monopoly of power over the territory of the entire state (not only because of 
the civil war but due to the general dynamics, weakness and underdevelopment of the state). 
In addition to the complex internal dynamics of South Sudan, the researched state is 
also subject to external influences: it relates to numerous state and non-state actors in the 
international arena and this network is changing over time. Should we examine the country’s 
position in the international space, the static definition of the state will not be sufficient. 
The dynamic definition which describes the state as a process and has already been 
successfully applied for analysing the effects of statebuilding on the state (de Guevara, 2008, 
p. 361), is more appropriate for the present research: the state is a power field that has been 
                                                          
2 A significant part of South Sudan’s border is not entirely delineated: neither the new international border with 
Sudan, nor a section of the border with Kenya (Ilemi triangle).  
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constructed by the use and threat of violence. The state is formulated, on the one hand, by the 
image of a coherent controlling institution, which represents the population defined by the 
given territory, and the state is shaped, on the other hand, by the activities and practices of the 
persons and officials representing the state (Migdal - Schlichte, 2005, p. 15). In this approach, 
the image and the practice of the state are the two dimensions of the state that parallelly exist 
and interact with each other. 
The dynamic interpretation of the state as a process provides an opportunity for a 
constructivist approach, i.e. to incorporate culture and identity into the analysis, thereby 
complementing the paradigm of realist and liberal main theories (Kiss J, 2013, p. 11) and, at 
the same time, to interpret and analyse the development of the state as a trajectory, a historical 
process (Bayart, 2009, p. 180). 
Before the accurate conceptualisation of external and internal statebuilding we need to 
define the concept of statebuilding. 
Statebuilding in the 1990s and 2000s meant the establishment of new government 
institutions and the strengthening of existing ones (Fukuyama, 2005, p. 7), which aimed to 
eradicate the weaknesses of non-western states through the export of the western state (Badie, 
2000, p. 48-57), by the establishment and/or support of working democracy, functioning 
market economy and effective civil society (Marton, 2009, p. 19). The ideological background 
was ensured by the idea of the liberal peace created by the theory of neoliberalism: the firm 
belief that the state is fundamentally healthy and the people, groups and dynamics that caused 
the problems are "non-liberals" and can be altered by external intervention and guidance to 
“heal the sick state” (Chandler, 2016, p. 4) by addressing the economic and security problems 
and creating or reinforcing the institutions for democratization. However, this model proved to 
be ineffective and overly simplified in practice (think of Bosnia, Kosovo and Afghanistan for 
example). History has not come to an end and a multitude of Zakaria's illiberal democracies 
are still present in the international arena. 
As a criticism of neoliberal democracy exports, László Csicsmann, following Bertrand 
Badie, describes the statebuilding of the 21st century as reimported state, whose success is in 
keeping with the consistency of external and internal statebuilding processes and the cultural 
and political readiness of external actors (Csicsmann, 2009, p. 15). As one of the criticisms of 
statebuilding practices in the two decades between 1990 and 2010, it is also important to note 
that the events of the "Arab spring" have refuted many of the statebuilding theories due to their 
practical inflexibility and their implementation problems. 
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The universalist approaches of the imported state and of liberal peace, as well as the 
local top-down implementation of the policies imagined at the western headquarters brought 
too many structural problems: beyond the fundamental legitimacy issues, instead of creating 
modern states compatible with global governance, these resulted in the internationalization 
and informalization of the state (de Guevara, 2008, p. 350). The new elements (e.g. the 
legislative institutions) seem to have been incorporated (internationalization), but translated 
and re-interpreted (informalization) according to the state’s own dynamics. 
In the dissertation, we use the concept of statebuilding in a broader sense: in addition 
to the external "help" we also include the statebuilding activity of the South Sudanese 
government and elite, as well as the statebuilding endeavours of non-state actors in South 
Sudan, thus the idea of parallel statebuildings. 
The external supportive statebuilding follows two fundamental lines in South Sudan: it 
helps the new state to integrate into the international arena and helps in the reconstruction in 
the post-conflict and in-conflict periods. It should be noted, however, that the external 
statebuilding uses known schemes that do not substantially alter the relationship between the 
underdeveloped and oppressed population and the exploitative elite, maintains the three-
decade-long aid-dependence and finds little solution to the problems of the UN peacekeeping. 
The driving force behind the internal statebuilding is the survival and prosperity of the 
elite, the public and the local non-state actors (the heavily controlled civil sphere that is present 
only in the capital, Juba and in some of the provincial centres and the church3 that is present 
and trusted in most places), but the means of survival of the elite clash in a civil war with the 
survival of the population and with the goals of local statebuilding. The elite are delaying the 
"liberation" of the people in the state that has already become independent. In the invisible 
dimension they try to maintain the acquired power by keeping the logic of the colonial rule and 
forcing it on the population, and in the visible dimension they show the façade of the 
democratizing and developing state both for the international community and for the 
population. 
The result of governmental and political dialogue as a criticism of neoliberal 
intervention policies led to a paradigm shift in statebuilding theories: using the pragmatic 
philosophy of resilience4, by the 2010s statebuilding has been increasingly focusing on reality 
                                                          
3 The church (mainly episcopal and catholic) is the strongest local and non-governmental humanitarian and 
political actor outside Juba. 
4 Flexibility, the right skill to successfully face the challenges of external problems and threats (Chandler, 2015, 
28).  
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on the ground. This bottom-up approach abandons the paternalistic, external viewpoint of the 
external statebuilding actor, and focuses on existing networks, informal reality, while building 
on the transformative power of local practices and interpretations, thus supersedes the paradox 
of liberal peace5. With this approach, the subject and object of external statebuilding can be 
eliminated, opening the way for a cooperative, much more efficient statebuilding, but this 
critical sociological paradigm brings in a set of problems to be solved (Chandler, 2015, p. 48). 
These are new debates between policy makers, implementators and academics. 
After clarifying the notion of statebuilding, the next step towards the conceptualisation 
of the external and internal statebuilding is to define the external and internal terms in the 
context of the analysis of the dissertation. 
The statebuilding is fundamentally external if the actors are not South Sudanese: either 
with solid (state actors, supranational actors and certain transnational actors) or with fluid 
(subnational and certain transnational actors) consistencies and either regional (e.g. Ethiopia, 
AU, IGAD6) or global (e.g. US, China, UN peacekeeping operation and UN organizations, 
NGOs that provide humanitarian assistance) actors7. 
The statebuilding is fundamentally internal if the actors are South Sudanese: 
governmental actors, the President, the ruling party, a member or a group of members of the 
army (SPLM/A - Sudan People’s Liberation Movement / Army), the (members of the) political 
or armed opposition, the self-defence groups of local communities, the church, NGOs, think 
tanks and other members or groups of the civil sphere. 
Separation of the two concepts is not necessary, but it is very useful for the analysis: 
external statebuilding moves on the fields of aid, intervention and peacebuilding, it shapes or 
tries to shape the state, necessarily has an impact on it and affects its trajectory. Internal 
statebuilding is the set of actions that follow or attempt to modify the internal dynamics, power 
and political thinking of the state, which at the various levels of consciousness simultaneously 
follows its own logic and responds to external statebuilding and other impacts. 
The (currently known) limitations of the use of external-internal terminology: 
1. It is sometimes unclear whether a statebuilding actor is external or internal (i.e.  
hybrid, such as the heterogeneous community of the South Sudanese diaspora, 
                                                          
5 The incorporation of the rights and laws defined by the liberal peace framework is either too far from reality on 
the ground and may have unexpected results, or too customised to the local context (risk of cultural relativism 
that may erode the democratic values) and loses its essence on the way (Chandler, 2015, 30). 
6 Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the AU REC (African Union Regional Economic Community) 
of the Horn region. 
7 For the consistencies see Kiss J, 2013, 8. 
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commonly referred to as "internet warriors" pointing to their propagandist activities 
in the social media). 
2. External and internal actors can cooperate or clash in an action. In such cases the 
classification of the event as external or internal is problematic. 
3. It is not always possible to find out who the actor(s) is (are) in the chain of actions 
and reactions. 
The external-internal statebuilding terminology was used in the dissertation in the light 
of its limitations. 
 In the case of external statebuilding actors, we distinguish northern (orthodox) actors8 
who, since the end of the Cold War9, have been acting on the path of the mainstream neoliberal 
intervention or, more recently, on the path of its criticism, and southern (global and regional) 
actors10 who act based on the realist discourse (clash of interests) in the country. A definition 
of the two groups is required for the analytical framework, but the grouping of each external 
actor is far from clear: for example, the AU and its regional organizations are southern regional 
actors, but they do intervene in South Sudanese events according to the logic of neoliberal 
intervention. 
 During the analysis, we use the dual terminology of the real and virtual political spaces 
originated from the interaction and mutual impact of the external statebuilding and 
interventions and the internal dynamics and state-formation (Tüske, 2012, p. 24). 
 The real political space is the space of autocratic centralization of power, the local form 
of the raw exercise of power, the synonym of Bayart’s invisible, the real power, the stage of 
the politics of the belly11. When a new element appears in the real space because of the actions 
of external statebuilding, we can use the concept of the above mentioned informalization. 
 The virtual political space is the imported form of the state institution system, which 
conceals realistic decision-making mechanisms, executes decisions made in real political 
space through the institutions of the virtual political space. This is Bayart’s visible dimension, 
the façade, which projects the effectiveness of top-down external statebuilding. New elements 
                                                          
8 The „troika” (US, UK and Norway), the UN and its internal organisations and other northern state and non-state 
(mainly NGOs) actors. 
9 During the Cold War after the decolonization, paternalistic (realist) intervention was applied by international 
public and non-state actors (most notably the UN, later the World Bank and IMF and non-governmental aid 
organizations). 
10 China, India, Kenya, Uganda, Ethiopia, AU and its organizations and other actors from the Global South. 
11 Politique du ventre: a phrase originated from Cameroon and used by Bayart. It means that the human being 
with an empty stomach is driven by different goals than the one with a full stomach, and the politics of the belly 
is the real driving force, the so called invisible (Bayart, 2009). 
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appearing in virtual political space indicate the process of internationalization as defined 
above. 
The dissertation transforms the theoretical framework through the theory of 
international relations’ different approaches or – using a more visual term – „glasses” and 
explore the formation, development, evolution, dimensions and dynamics of the South 
Sudanese state. 
The theoretical framework and the analysis are not limited to a grand theory of 
international relations. The research has perceived and applied the (neo)realist, (neo)liberal, 
constructivist and new leftist theories with comparative method. The analysis of the subject 
required to analyse the role of the examined state on the local, regional and global stages with 
the realist approach, to examine the network of the liberal approach, to apply the relevant 
theses of the new leftist trends that were popular in South Sudan, and to use the dependency 
theory in critical and historical context. 
To define the methodology and the analytical framework of the research, we used 
books, book chapters, journals and articles in Hungarian and English, specializing in the 
theories of international relations, transitology, statebuilding and state-formation. 
 Bertrand Badie's work on statebuilding during and after colonialization (Badie, 2000) 
was one of the theoretic starting points, in which he identifies and analyses the framework of 
statehood forced on colonial states. We need to mention here Benedict Anderson’s pioneering 
work, the Imagined Communities, on the "invention" of the postcolonial nation and on the 
implementation of the European models and Chatterjee’s work about the relationship and 
linkage between nationalism and colonial states (Chatterjee, 1993). 
 The statebuilding theories were reviewed from the 1990s to the present (from 
Fukuyama and Huntington and Badie to de Guevara and Chandler and of course, we have taken 
the contribution of domestic academics into account, most notably the works of László Kiss J, 
Péter Marton, Péter Wagner, László Csicsmann, László Tüske and Péter Rada), then we defined 
our research questions and created the theoretical framework to answer our research questions 
and to test our hypotheses. 
For the study of the state of South Sudan, it was indispensable to examine the 
phenomenon and development of the African statehood through a review of a selection of the 
political Africanist studies (Bayart, Bates, Herbst, Hyden, Reno), during which the relevant 
Hungarian political Africanist studies (mostly Mihály Benkes, Gábor Búr, István Tarrósy and 
other members of the Africa Research Center in Pécs) were also processed. 
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In the chapters of the case study, we reviewed the prominent English-language works 
of local and foreign literature written on South Sudan. Hungarian sources are few on the subject 
and almost non-existent beyond the author's publications, thus the research is significant from 
this aspect as well. 
The review of the South Sudan specific literature (books, articles, reports and 
commentaries) written by South Sudanese and foreign think tanks, politicians, diplomats, and 
academics from different universities in the world (most notably Douglas H Johnson, Edward 
Thomas, Jok Madut Jok, Luka Biong Deng, Lam Akol, Peter Adwok Nyaba, Amir Idris, 
Oystein H Rolandsen, Alex de Waal, John Young, Cherry Leonardi and the new generation: 
Luke Patey, Nicki Kindersley, Daniel Large, etc.) on the fields of statebuilding, political 
studies, conflict studies, history and anthropology, were extended with the documents of the 
South Sudanese government, the relevant documents and reports of the UN, AU, IGAD and 
other international organizations, and last but not least with the international news agencies 
and news portals, relevant commentaries and reports. 
We divided the resources to primary sources, which are the relevant decisions, laws, 
treaties, agreements, speeches of external and internal actors of statebuilding, and to secondary 
resources, which are monographs and studies of general and even thematic or regional specific 
literature, as well as analyses, reports, articles, commentaries, and newsletters for the case 
study. 
In the structure of the dissertation, after the methodological part, it was indispensable 
to put the statebuilding first into African then to South Sudanese context. 
The analysis of South Sudan was divided into two parts: in the first part we describe 
the emergence, evolution and status of the South Sudanese state (historical part), and in the 
second part we examine the parallel statebuildings (analytical part). 
The scientific work during the analysis were driven by the research questions. After we 
created the analytical framework we formulated the following hypotheses that were tested in 
the case study: 
 
H1 
 
We assume that the SPLM (the liberation movement that became the government) did not 
change the logic of the colonial state, and operates the real political space without any 
substantive change since independence: South Sudan became a state of permanent 
colonization. 
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(For the comprehensiveness of testing and for the explanation of certain aspects of H1, we 
formulated) 
 
H2 
 
We assume that the current South Sudanese elite have inadequate means and insufficient 
motivation to transform the real political space as: 
 
- the liberation movement did not reform the army and the movement 
 
- although the elite control the clientelist system, the clientelist system holds the elite, the status 
quo is unchanged 
 
- the legitimacy of the liberation movement is still strong in the real and virtual political spaces  
 
- forced concessions caused by external or internal effects in virtual political space are 
insufficient to change the real political space 
 
- neither the grass-roots level initiatives nor the political and armed opposition activities have 
resulted in reforms in the real political space  
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3. Results of the Research 
 
The negative South Sudanese identity (non-foreign, non-Sudanese, non-dinka, etc.), 
that was emerged from the historical heritage, continuous resistance and struggle, the 
permanent colonization (cementing the colonial state), the outsourced statebuilding 
(international community), the delivery of the basic services (humanitarian and developmental 
NGOs) and outsourced grass-roots level peacebuilding (church, local communities) are our 
main observations, which are important features of the idea of parallel statebuildings. 
The elite and population of the state were formulated under unusual circumstances and 
in unusual times adapt to external actors. The population uses the existing opportunities, and 
the elite exploit the same to continue the existing internal dynamics of South Sudan. In J.-F. 
Bayart's words: the invisible defeats the visible. We extended this statement: the invisible does 
not only defeat, but transforms the visible as well. 
The research questions were leading the analysis and when the results of the parallel 
statebuildings were listed, we found that although the possible results of the external and the 
internal statebuilding (the latter led by political opposition, church, the civil sphere) could have 
reached the real political space during the last decades, especially in the peace period of 2005-
2013, these statebuilding results were limited to the virtual political space in the absence of 
unified pressures and lobbying of the international diplomacy. It was a fundamental mistake 
by the northern (orthodox) state and transnational actors of the international community that 
South Sudan was not only treated as a newcomer among the states in 2011, but many thought 
South Sudan is a tabula rasa, an excellent statebuilding subject. This approach meant in policy-
making centres that based on decades of accumulated experiences in the fields of statebuilding, 
peacekeeping, and post-conflict reconstruction, the best structures tailored to South Sudan can 
be set up and operated in the country. However, South Sudanese knew the state as an oppressive 
entity. The liberator SPLM has been used the patterns of the oppressive state model before and 
during the interim period of the CPA (Comprehensive Peace Agreement, signed in 2005, the 
agreement that finished the second north-south civil war and ultimately led to South Sudan’s 
independence). The SPLM continued the colonial establishment, only the colonial centre was 
brought within the territory of South Sudan (after London, Cairo and Khartoum the centre 
became South Sudan's capital, Juba). 
The external statebuilding and the internal one by the political opposition, the church 
and the civil sphere has missed the opportunity to enforce a paradigm shift in South Sudan's 
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political thinking and policy making and thus contributed to the outbreak of the second 
Southern civil war. 
H1 was found to be valid during the analysis. We proved that in the first years after the 
separation from Sudan, the independent South Sudan recreated the colonial state it fought 
against for decades, thus became the state of permanent colonization. The state being built has 
been trapped in the familiar patterns and internal dynamics of the country, and the South 
Sudanese elite have become colonizers of their own people using the existing model. 
The process of nation building began after the repression, but following the unwritten 
laws of the internal dynamics of South Sudan, two years after the independence the political 
power games turned to a violent, quickly spreading country-wide armed conflict fuelled by 
ethnic nationalism and clientelist logic. 
While defining and analysing the three types of the parallel statebuildings, we could 
observe that external statebuilding can only be successful if its goals match the objectives of 
the internal statebuilding. Otherwise, the external statebuilding effort will not only fail but will 
only help to fulfil the elite's goals. A good example of this phenomenon when the elite include 
humanitarian aid as a state resource. 
H2 and its sub hypotheses were found to be valid, so we proved these during the 
analysis. By examining and proving our hypotheses, we have not only identified important 
statements about statebuilding and state-formation in South Sudan, which can be used even for 
diplomatic purposes, but we placed the case study in an appropriate theoretical context of 
statebuilding and contributed to the scientific discussion of statebuilding and state 
development. In additiona to that we created new terminology with the concept of permanent 
colonization. 
The external statebuilding project (virtual political space) obeys the internal dynamics 
of South Sudan (real political space) and the state should play under these rules. The nature 
and rules of the real exercise of power are shaped by corruption, the rule of arms rather than 
the law, and the self-service government that neglects the needs of the population (Johnson, 
2016, p. 18). 
The internal statebuilding, guided by the neopatrimonial real exercise of power, the 
legacy of the liberation movement, and the counter-forces created as a critique of this legacy 
(counter-and complementary statebuilding) are in continuous interaction with the external 
statebuilding directed by the shifting intervention policies. 
South Sudan received all types of external statebuilding: from the paternalistic and self-
interest-based statebuilding of the Cold War, through the ideologically committed top-down, 
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neoliberal statebuilding based on the export of the western state, to the specialised bottom-up 
statebuilding based on socio-cultural norms and values. The South Sudanese elite became both 
resistant against and dependent on external statebuilding practices, and the development of the 
political thinking followed these changes and evolved to a violent one over centuries of 
repression and (civil) wars in South Sudan. 
Invisible defeated the visible, the events in the real political space are increasingly 
ignoring the framework of the virtual political space. The central power structures do not reach 
certain peripheries. These peripheries create temporary liberated territories that remain 
independent until the arrival of the army. When the army arrives, either an armed struggle 
begins to defeat (results in the displacement of the civilian population) or "to buy" (integrate 
to the "big tent") the rebels. 
The SPLM developed dynamically prior to independence, but has moved backwards 
since and has fallen into the armed conflict. It seems no form of external intervention 
(reconciliatory negotiations at local, regional and global level, peace agreement / ARCSS / 
peacekeeping / UNMISS12 / development and humanitarian aid) can push the leadership of the 
state through good governance, or at least to remove the possibility to argue with weapons from 
political thinking and nation-building practice. 
We have found that the non-monetary version of the real political space, the intricate 
and constantly changing network of armed conflicts remains the basis of internal dynamics 
until the current ruling elite or the armed opposition driven by the same logic dominate the 
centre and the periphery. 
There are signs of change in the applied political thinking (reconciliatory efforts of the 
church at community level and the temporary political alliances of the armed opposition), but 
there is still a long and slippery path to meaningful change. 
 For the current catastrophic economic and humanitarian situation of South Sudan, the 
ruling elite make the armed opposition responsible for and outsources the symptomatic 
treatment of the problems, i.e. it expects quick fixes from external statebuilding actors. 
Meanwhile, they continue to use armed strikes and the violent control of the peripheries. 
The orthodox actors of external statebuilding make the ruling elite responsible for the 
implementation failures of the defined and planned reforms (based on the actual intervention 
and statebuilding paradigm and on local characteristics), and blame these missing reforms for 
the unchanged means of fighting for power and for the acquisition of resources. The use of the 
                                                          
12 United Nations Mission in South Sudan – UN’s peacekeeping mission established in July 2011. 
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shifting statebuilding policies in South Sudan did not answer the basic problems of South 
Sudan. 
The armed and political opposition of South Sudan makes the ruling elite responsible 
for the current problems and reckon that the solutions for these problems come once they grab 
the power, however there is no guarantee that their practices in power would not coincide with 
the survival of the violent neopatrimonialist and clientelist system. 
A real solution would be sharing the responsibility and the accountability, e.g. by using 
the hybrid court foreseen in the ARCSS. However, to set up and operate the HCSS, the Hybrid 
Court for South Sudan (IGAD, 2015, p. 43) requires nationwide peace. The South Sudanese 
ruling elite know that as long as the civil war situation persists, there is very little chance of 
accountability, and there is still a chance to retain power with appropriate steps in the virtual 
political space (such as the December 2016 announcement and May 2017 launch of the 
National dialogue). 
The ARCSS, which excluded civil war actors from the peace process and later from the 
signatories of the agreement, as the CPA did, has been on "breathing device" since the Juba 
incidents in July 2016. It remained valid in the visible dimension: regional leaders still urged 
its implementation on the IGAD June 2017 extraordinary meeting and called to keep the cease-
fire that was announced (but repeatedly violated after) by the government at the launch of the 
National dialogue (IGAD, 2017). However, in the invisible dimension, the elite of South Sudan 
reached their own goals: the ARCSS power-sharing government became Salva Kiir’s 
(president of South Sudan) next "big tent". 
The struggle for power remained the only struggle in South Sudan inside and outside 
the so-called liberation movement. Moving power struggles inside the SPLA / M did not allow 
the movement and the army to be transformed. The activity of international humanitarian actors 
did not force the movement to the next level of progress: to change attitude, i.e. to provide 
services in the liberated areas. The size of the international statebuilding project allowed the 
SPLM to outsource statebuilding and to conserve the power struggle of the elite, which was 
only exacerbated by the appearance of oil revenues in 2005. 
Kiir's results were the creation of the "big tent" and to delay the start of the second 
Southern civil war until 2013. The current elite and opposition is incapable to proceed with the 
next statebuilding and nation-building steps and the international community's external 
statebuilding project does not bring any substantive change: paradigm shift is necessary. 
Despite the well-funded external statebuilding in the virtual political space, despite the 
achievements in the visible dimension, South Sudan's real political space, its invisible 
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dimension is ultimately unchanged and follows the logic of militant kleptocracy. The external 
statebuilding project essentially failed with the start of the civil war in 2013. Regardless of the 
pressure and intensity of the external statebuilding plans, i.e. the process of 
internationalization, the statebuilding continues to obey the internal dynamics, since even the 
most specific, most sophisticated and complex statebuilding model will fail if internal logic 
opposes it or is lacking the internal structures for its inclusion. All external statebuilding 
practices remained only on the surface of the evolution of South Sudanese rules and life, and 
these practices only provide the basic services to those who have fallen out of the clientelist 
structure, thus creating and nurturing the aid-dependence of the population and the attached 
parts of the elite. 
Traditional Sudanese dynamics have recently become more complex in the virtual 
political space, but follow the same old logic in real political space. 
Placing the National dialogue into the real political space would make possible the 
wording of the permanent constitution prescribed by the ARCSS, then put it into effect and 
keep the elections that closes the transitional period, but as we have seen in the analysis, the 
South Sudanese elite have inadequate means and insufficient motivation to implement these. 
Therefore, it seems that both ARCSS and the National dialogue remain in the virtual political 
space, and the usage of violence and the permanent colonization seem to be inevitable for years 
to come. 
The basic dynamics of South Sudan did not change because of external statebuilding, 
and although it is developing during the civil war of state-formation, in the near future, even 
with the exchange of leader(s), no fundamental change is expected. 
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